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RECENT DECISIONS
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-REsTicTIvE PRACTICES-COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MAY ORDER SPECIFIC
RELIEF TO CURE ABUSE OF A DOMINANT MARKET POSITION UNDER
ARTICLE 86.

The United States-based Commercial Solvents Corporation
(CSC) produces and sells various chemical compounds that include two nitroparaffines, nitropropane and aminobutanol, which
are refinable into ethambutol, the basic element of several antituberculosis drug specialties. In 1962 CSC acquired 51 per cent of
the voting stock of Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano, SpA (ICI), an
Italian corporation, which until 1970 acted as a re-seller of CSC's
products within the Common Market. Among ICI's customers for
CSC's American-made aminobutanol was Laboratorio Chemico
Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja, SpA (Zoja), which began buying aminobutanol in 1966 for refinement into ethambutol and ethambutolbased specialties. In 1968 ICI began development of its own drug
specialties similar to those produced by Zoja. ICI received governmental registration for their manufacture in November, 1969, and
began production in 1970. In the spring of 1970 Zoja cancelled the
remainder of its contract with ICI, finding a cheaper source for
aminobutanol on the world market. Also, early in 1970, CSC announced that it would no longer supply either nitropropane or
aminobutanol to the EEC, but rather an up-graded intermediate
product, dextro-aminobutanol, which ICI would then further refine into bulk ethambutanol for its own use and for sale to other
producers of specialties within the Community. Near the end of
1970, Zoja placed an order with ICI for aminobutanol and ICI
inquired as to whether CSC would again supply crude aminobutanol. CSC replied that it would not, and Zoja found that it was
unable to obtain aminobutanol elsewhere since all sources led back
to CSC. Being the only manufacturer possessing the sophisticated
equipment and technology necessary for the nitration of paraffin
on a large scale, CSC held an effective world monopoly on the
nitroparaffine market. In the precarious position of being without
a source of supply for its chief raw material, Zoja applied to the
Commission of the European Communities for relief, arguing that
CSC and ICI had breached article 86 of the EEC Treaty, i.e., that
the defendants had abused their dominant market position.' The
1.

Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC), March 25, 1957,
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Commission agreed, and imposed, jointly and severally, the following sanctions: (1) a fine of 200,000 units of account; 2 (2) under
penalty of a fine of 1,000 units of account per day, ordered CSC to
supply either 60,000 kilograms of nitropropane or 30,000 kilograms
of aminobutanol to Zoja, as its most urgent needs, at a price not
exceeding the maximum price charged for the two products; and
(3) under penalty of a second fine of 1,000 units of account per day,
ordered CSC to submit within two months proposals for the subsequent continuing supply of Zoja.3 The time limits for the execution
of the sanctions were extended so that CSC and ICI might appeal
their case to the Court of Justice of the European Communities.4

On appeal the companies argued that article 86 does not vest the
Commission with power to order specific relief, and pointed out
that the Commission had never before done so. The Court of Jusarticle 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject or such contracts.
The authoritative English text of the treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrris (Office of Official Publications of
the European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text may be found
in 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
2. A unit of account is not an actual currency in that it is not a means or an
instrument of payment. The unit of account is rather a means of accounting used
to measure the value of obligations. The value of the unit of account was not
chosen arbitrarily. In 1950, seventeen European nations formed the European
Payments Union (EPU). It had a unit of account ("Epunit") with a value of
0.88867088 grams of fine gold. The EPU was replaced in 1958 by the European
Currency Agreement-but the same unit of account was maintained and adopted
by the EEC in 1960. 2 CCH CoM. MKT. REP. 5042 (1971).
3. Laboratorio Chemico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja SpA v. Commercial Solvents Corp. & Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano, [1973] Official Journal of the
European Communities L299/51 [hereinafter cited as J.O.], 12 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. D50 (1973).
4. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Commission, [1973] European Court Reports 357 [hereinafter cited as ECR],
12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 361 (1973).
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tice held that the Commission decision be affirmed. When an undertaking abuses a dominant market position by depriving a competitor of its sole source of raw materials, the Commission may,
within the purview of article 86, order affirmative relief by requiring the undertaking to supply the competitor's continuing requirements in that raw material, and exact fines and penalties for the
failure to supply. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
8209, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974).
Several previous cases had been decided by the Court that effectively laid the foundation for the instant opinion.' In 1973 the
Court of Justice relied on the policy-establishing language of article 28 and article 3(f)7 to emphasize the role of article 86 in ensuring
a competitive market.8 Speaking about article 86 in the
Continental Can case, the Court said the provision applies not only
to practices that prejudice consumers directly, but also to those
that prejudice consumers through interference in the structure of
actual competition." From this clear reference to article 3(f), it is
only a short step back to the broader language of article 2 which
aims at "harmonious development of economic activities." The
issue of the liability of a corporation domiciled outside the EEC
for infringing on the competitive structure of the Common Market
was settled in 1972 by the Court in the Beguelin case.10 Interpreting
article 8511 the Court held that the fact that one of the undertak5.

For an overview of Court of Justice case law through 1973 see K. LIPSTEIN,

THE LAW OF THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC CommtuNrrY (1974).

6.

EEC art. 2 provides: "The Community shall have as its task, by establish-

ing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it."
7. EEC art. 3(f) provides: "for the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities
of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance
with the timetable set out therein . . . (f) the institution of a system ensuring
that competition in the common market is not distorted. .. ."
8. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, [1973]
E.C.R. 215, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8171, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
9. [1973] E.C.R. at 245, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8171 at 8300, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 225.
10. Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA, 17 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communaute Europeenne) [hereinafter
cited as Recueil] 949, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. T 8149, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81
(1972) (Nov. 25, 1971).

11.

Article 85 sets out specific examples of monopolistic practices prohibited
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ings involved in the agreement was situated in a non-Member
country was no obstacle to the application of that provision, "so
long as the agreement produces its effects in the territory of the
Common Market."'" But one question left for the Court in
CommercialSolvents was the magnitude of the effect on the competitive structure of the EEC necessary before the Court would
rule the practice in violation of the Treaty. If article 2's goal of
promoting the harmonious development of economic activities is
to be implemented, great flexibility and wide-ranging jurisdiction
must be combined in the standard set out by the Court in
delineating the antitrust or market regulating authority within the
Common Market. Words having the sound of guidelines were set
out in the Beguelin case,' 3 but this ephemeral standard needed
another decision to vitalize its vague outlines. The issue of whether
the Commission may order affirmative relief has not been previously addressed by the Court.
Moving into largely virgin areas, the Court in Commercial
Solvents set out five main issues 4 and attacked each in succession.
The Court had little difficulty in deciding that CSC held a dominant position with regard to the supply of nitropropane and aminobutanol. As a strictly factual matter, the Court took notice that
except for a small amount produced expensively and experimentally, the vast majority of the world's ethambutol was produced by
CSC, ICI, American Cyanimid, and Zoja-but that all depended
on raw materials produced only by CSC. I5 With an effective world
within the Common Market.
12. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8149 at 7704, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 95. For
a thorough discussion of the distinction between articles 85 and 86 see D. LASOK
& J.

BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

265-78 (1973).
13. "To be incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited under
Article 85, an agreement must be 'capable of affecting trade between memberStates' and have 'the object or effect' of interfering with 'competition within the
Common Market."' 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8149 at 7704, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 95.
14. As seen by the Court, the issues were: (1) whether CSC and ICI held a
dominant position within the meaning of article 86; (2) which market must be
considered to determine the existence vel non of a dominant position; (3) whether,
if CSC and ICI were in a dominant position in the EEC, they abused that position; (4) whether such abuse affected trade between Member States; and (5)
whether CSC and ICI acted as a single economic unit. [1974] E.C.R. at 246, 24753, 2 CCH Comm.MKT.REP. 8209 at 8818, 8818-20, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 337,
337-42.
15. [1974] E.C.R. at 248, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8819, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 338-39.
COMMUNITIES
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monopoly, CSC unquestionably enjoyed a "dominant position"
within the Common Market as required by article 86. The Court
next rejected CSC's contention that when the market in ethambutol is considered CSC is not in a dominant position. This was held
to be a spurious argument; the raw materials market (in which
CSC had a virtual world monopoly) was the proper market to
consider for the purpose of the complaint by Zoja, since Zoja
bought raw materials to produce ethambutol, and not ethambutol
itself."6 CSC objected that after Zoja cancelled its contract with ICI
in the spring of 1970 CSC was not obligated to renew the contract
to supply Zoja with either nitropropane or aminobutanol. The
Court found this irrelevant, declaring that CSC would have ceased
supplying Zoja in 1970 regardless of Zoja's cancellation of the contract with ICI. The Court went on to spell out CSC's abuse of its
dominant position in precise detail, holding that a producer of raw
materials which begins manufacturing related refined products
may not withhold those same raw materials from former customers
in order to eliminate competition in the market for their newly
available finished products. 7 CSC then argued that refusing to
supply nitropropane to Zoja would have no effect within the EEC,
since tuberculosis rates are low in western Europe and Zoja is
almost totally blocked from selling its specialties within the Common Market by patents held by American Cyanimid. The Court
also rejected this argument, noting that although Zoja sells 90 per
cent of its anti-tuberculosis drugs in developing nations with high
tuberculosis rates, it ships the other ten per cent to two Coin16. [1974] E.C.R. at 249-50, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. RaP. 8209 at 8819, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 339-40.
17. In the words of the Court:
[A]n undertaking being in a dominant position as regards the production of raw material and therefore able to control the supply to manufactur-

ers of derivatives cannot, just because it decides to start manufacturing
these derivatives (in competition with its former customers), act in such a
way as to eliminate their competition which, in the case in question, would
have amounted to eliminating one of the principal manufacturers of ethambutol in the Common Market. Since such conduct is contrary to the objectives expressed in Article 3(f) of the Treaty and set out in greater detail in
Articles 85 and 86, it follows that an undertaking which has a dominant
position in the market in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to
supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and
therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is
abusing its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 ... [1974]
E.C.R. at 250-51, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8820, 13 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 340-41.
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munity nations."8 The Court, however, did not rest its holding that
CSC/ICI abused their dominant position on the narrow ground of
the ten per cent of Zoja's specialties sold within the EEC, but
rather on the 90 per cent exported out of the Community." When
an undertaking in a dominant position within the Common Market abusively exploits its position in such a way that a competitor
within the Common Market is likely to be eliminated, "it does not
matter whether the conduct relates to the latter's exports or its
trade within the Common Market.
... 1o
Because Zoja's exports
are endangered by CSC's actions, trade between Member States
may be affected, as contemplated by article 86. CSC's final salvo
was a two-pronged tautology concerning the relationship between
CSC and ICI-since CSC did not operate within the EEC it could
not be liable, and since ICI had no monopoly or dominant position
(although it admittedly operated within the EEC) it also must be
free of liability under article 86. Mentioning the attempt to merge
Zoja into ICI, which collapsed just prior to CSC's decision to substitute dextro-aminobutanol rather than either nitropropane or
aminobutanol as its exported raw material to the Common Market, the Court held that at least with respect to their dealings with
Zoja, "the two companies [CSC and ICI] must be deemed an
economic unit."'" As a single unit their liability was confirmed as
joint and several, but the principal fine of 200,000 units of account
was halved because quicker action by the Commission in response
to Zoja's complaint would have mitigated the damages." The
Court treated the issue of affirmative relief off-handedly, first not18. [1974] E.C.R. at 252, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8820, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 342.
19. The European Community has shown special concern for developing nations. At the time the Commercial Solvents litigation was progressing in the

European Court of Justice, negotiations were being conducted that led to the
signing of the Lome Convention in February, 1975. This convention calls for close

economic and technical cooperation between the nations of the EEC and 46 ACP
(African, Caribbean, and Pacific) developing nations. As parallel and contemporaneous developments, the Lome Convention and the Commercial Solvents reasoning indicate strong sympathetic ties felt within the Common Market toward
the third world. This attitude may perhaps affect future decisions as it indirectly

influenced the Court in the case at hand.
20. [19741 E.C.R. at 252-53, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.

8209 at 8821, 13

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342.
21.

[19741 E.C.R. at 254, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. RFP.

8209 at 8822, 13 Comm.

Mkt. L.R. at 344.
22. [1974] E.C.R. at 257, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. $ 8209 at 8823, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 346.
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ing that article 3 of Regulation 17/6221 provides that when the
Commission finds an infringement of article 86, "it may by decision require the undertakings . . . concerned to bring such infringements to an end." Since the regulation does not describe
measures that the Commission may take, the Court held that
"[tihis provision must be applied in relation to the infringement. ' 24 The Commission may, therefore, make any order reasonably designed for "bringing the situation into conformity with the
requirements of the Treaty."
This landmark decision is the first time that the Court of Justice
has ordered a party abusing a dominant position to correct that
abuse constructively, by requiring the monopolizer -to sell to the
complaining and injured party sufficient quantities to satisfy that
party's requirements. Although not novel when compared with
United States antitrust law, 26 this is one large step beyond previous
decisions within the EEC.Y The wide spectrum of remedies available under American law, 28 ranging from criminal prosecution, to
administrative orders, and to civil suits where the broad powers of
equity are available, has not previously been applied within the
Common Market. The Commission has been limited to declaring
practices unlawful, imposing fines and issuing cease and desist
orders.2 9 Commercial Solvents may well be an indication from the
European Court that the American arsenal against antitrust is
recognized as necessary and effective in combatting the growing
problems of a more unified Community economy. Additionally,
23. Council Regulation No. 17/62, as amended by Council Regulation No.
59/62, [1962] J.O. 204, 1655, 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 2401 et seq. (1973).
24. [1974] E.C.R. at 255, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8822, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 345.
25. [1974] E.C.R. at 255, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8822, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 345. Additionally, the Court held that supplying Zoja would place
no strain on CSC since Zoja's needs would only consume approximately five or
six per cent of CSC's production capacity. [1974] E.C.R. at 251, 2 CCH CoMm.
MKT. REP. 8209 at 8820, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 341.
26. For a recent overview and comparison of antitrust in the United States
and the EEC see E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST
PRIMER (1974).

27. For discussion see 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 9644 (1974).
28. While the intricacies of United States antitrust legislation and its interpretation are beyond the scope of this comment, a contrasting consideration of
American and foreign economic regulation may be found in H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, MATERIALS ON TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

903-62 (1968).

29. Jones, American Anti-Trust and EEC CompetitionLaw in Comparative
Perspective, 90 LAW. Q. Ray. 191, 204 (1974).
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the scope of the definition of what is necessary to "affect trade
between Member States" as required by article 86 is stretched to
include more tangential effects than in earlier cases. Refusal to sell
by a market-dominating enterprise is made an abuse, although
not specifically listed in the text of article 86. This may permit
other practices, heretofore outside the reach of EEC antitrust law,
to be classified as abuses under article 86 and brought within the
regulation of the Community. It is no longer necessary for the
complaining party to have sales within the Common Market, only
that exports from the EEC are choked off by an abuse of a dominant position. After Commercial Solvents it would seem that little
proof, if any, is required to show that trade between Member
States is affected."0 The Court has broadened the reach of its sanctions by effectively eliminating this defense; any party trading
within the Community affects trade between Member States and
may be subject to the controls of article 86 if found to be abusing
their dominant position. The abuse may be by a corporation based
outside the Common Market which only exports raw materials into
the Community through a subsidiary. Based on the instant case,
the next decision might conceivably reach the foreign corporation
directly, dropping all pretenses of requiring economic unity of parent and subsidiary. One thing is certain, the scope of the authority
of the Court and its interpretations of the antitrust provisions of
the EEC Treaty are rapidly reaching beyond the geographical confines of the Common Market.
Mark A. Schneider
30. CommercialSolvents clarifies the interpretation of this key phrase of article 86 much as the Grundig-Constencase focused on the term "competition" as
used in article 85(1). C.f. Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v.
Commission, 12 Recueil 429, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8046, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
418 (1966).

